3 resultados para OVIPOSITIONAL PREFERENCE
em Instituto Politécnico do Porto, Portugal
Resumo:
We analyse the relationship between the privatization of a public firm and government preferences for tax revenue in a Stackelberg duopoly with the public firm as the leader. We assume that the government payoff is given by a weighted sum of tax revenue and the sum of consumer and producer surplus. We get that if the government puts a sufficiently larger weight on tax revenue than on the sum of both surpluses, it will not privatize the public firm. In contrast, if the government puts a moderately larger weight on tax revenue than on the sum of both surpluses, it will privatize the public firm.
Resumo:
We analyse the relationship between the privatization of a public firm and government preferences for environmental tax revenue. The model that we consider is more general than the one consider in Wang and Wang (2009), in the sense that we put a larger weight in the environment tax revenue than on the other terms of the government's objective function. The model has two stages. In the first stage, the government sets the environmental tax. Then, the firms engage in a Cournot competition, choosing output and pollution abatement levels.
Resumo:
In the last few years the number of systems and devices that use voice based interaction has grown significantly. For a continued use of these systems the interface must be reliable and pleasant in order to provide an optimal user experience. However there are currently very few studies that try to evaluate how good is a voice when the application is a speech based interface. In this paper we present a new automatic voice pleasantness classification system based on prosodic and acoustic patterns of voice preference. Our study is based on a multi-language database composed by female voices. In the objective performance evaluation the system achieved a 7.3% error rate.
